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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the case.

Stanley Phillip Sweet (hereinafter “Sweet”), appeals from the District Court’s Opinion
and Order on Appeal affirming the magistrate’s denial of Sweet’s Motion to Suppress and
Motions to take judicial notice. R., pp. 255 – 261. In particular, Sweet challenges the District
Court’s finding that the officer’s reading the citation and explaining the charges to Sweet was not
reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses. In addition, Sweet challenges the District
Court’s finding that the opinions of two magistrates regarding the victim’s truthfulness were not
facts that could be judicially noticed.
II.

Course of the Proceedings Below.

On October 1, 2016, Bonners Ferry Police Officer Willie Cowell arrested the Defendant,
Stanley Phillip Sweet, on the charge of domestic battery in the presence of a minor child, a
violation of Idaho Code § 18-918(3)(b) and (4). R., p. 7.
On October 31, 2016 Sweet filed a Motion to Suppress “any and all physical evidence,
statements, observations, and derivative evidence obtained as a result of any statements made by
the Defendant which were made as a result of a custodial interrogation of the Defendant by law
enforcement officers.” R., pp. 32 – 34. On November 1, 2016, Sweet filed with the Court a
Request for the Court to Take Judicial Notice, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence (hereinafter
“I.R.E.”) 201(d), of a Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on July 10, 2015 in Boundary
County Case No. CV-2006-52. R., pp. 56 – 73. On December 2, 2016, Sweet filed with the
Court a Certificate of Delivery of Second Document for Judicial Notice, referring to an Order on
1

Partial New Trail [sic] filed in Boundary County Case No. CV-2006-52 on November 30, 2016.
R., pp. 90 – 97.
A hearing on all of these pre-trial motions was held on December 16, 2016. R., pp. 129 –
130. After hearing testimony of witnesses and the legal arguments of counsel, the magistrate
denied Sweet’s Motion to Suppress. Id. After hearing the arguments of counsel regarding
Sweet’s Motions for the magistrate to take judicial notice of the two Orders in Boundary County
Case No. CV-2006-52, the magistrate denied the Motions. Id.
Sweet proceeded to a Jury Trial on the charge of domestic battery in the presence of a
minor child on December 20, 2016. R., pp. 131 – 139. Upon deliberation, the jury rendered a
“guilty” verdict. R., p. 167. Sweet was sentenced on January 24, 2017. R., p. 196. On March 6,
2017, Sweet filed a timely Notice of Appeal of the magistrate’s denial of his Motion to Suppress
and Motions to take judicial notice. R., pp. 210 – 212.
Oral argument on Sweet’s appeal to the District Court was held via telephone hearing
before the Honorable Jeff M. Brudie, District Judge, on August 31, 2017. R., pp. 253 – 254. On
September 18, 2017, Judge Brudie entered an Opinion and Order on Appeal, affirming the
magistrate’s denial of Sweet’s Motion to Suppress and Motions to take judicial notice. R., pp.
255 – 261. On October 27, 2017, Sweet filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme
Court. R., pp. 264 – 267.
III.

Statement of the Facts.

A pre-trial hearing was held on December 16, 2016 to address Sweet’s Motion to
Suppress and Motions to take judicial notice. The magistrate first took up the Motions to take
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judicial notice. Quoting from a Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Child Custody, Support,
and Misc. Issues entered by the same magistrate in Boundary County Case No. CV-2006-52 on
July 10, 2015 (R., pp. 58 – 73), trial counsel argued that the magistrate had previously found that
Rebecca Foreman, the victim in this criminal case, was not a credible witness. Tr., p. 1, L. 21 –
25; p. 2, L. 1 – 4. 1 Trial counsel further quoted from an Opinion on Partial New Trial entered by
another magistrate on November 30, 2016 in the same civil case (R., pp. 92 – 97), and argued
that this magistrate had also previously found that Ms. Foreman was not a credible witness. Tr.
p. 2, L. 5 – 10. Trial counsel asked the magistrate to take judicial notice that Ms. Foreman is not
a credible witness, and asked that the jury be instructed on that fact. Tr. p. 2, L. 10 -11; p. 3, L.
19.
In response, the State argued that a magistrate’s opinions form the basis of an order, but
an order is adjudicative fact. A memorandum opinion is not. Tr. p. 3, L. 7 – 8. The magistrate
ruled that a memorandum opinion is not the kind of thing that would be appropriate for the court
to take judicial notice of or to submit to a jury. Tr. p. 3, L. 23 – 25. The magistrate stated “So I
will take judicial notice, if you wish, of the judgment in the case as far as setting forth who has
custody, who has visitation, what the conditions are, if somehow that’s relevant.” Tr. p. 4, L. 14
– 16.
At the beginning of the suppression motion portion of the hearing, the State
acknowledged that there was no warrant involved in this case. Tr. p. 5, L. 5 – 7. Officer Willie
1

Transcript of hearing on Sweet’s Motion to Suppress and Motions to take judicial notice held on December 16,
2016.
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Cowell of the Bonners Ferry Police Department testified on behalf of the State. Officer Cowell
was on duty on October 1 [2016] at approximately 10:38 a.m. when he received a call for service
from dispatch to respond to the Bonners Ferry High School in reference to a domestic battery
that just occurred. Tr. P. 6, L. 3 – 10. Dispatch informed Officer Cowell that the parties
involved were Rebecca Foreman and the Appellant herein, [Stanley] Phillip Sweet. Tr. p. 6, L.
18 – 19. The State and Sweet’s trial counsel stipulated that Sweet was taken into custody and
that Sweet was not read his Miranda rights. Tr. p. 7, L. 17 – 20.
After Officer Cowell transported Sweet to the [Boundary County] Sheriff’s Office, he
remanded Sweet to the custody of detention deputies. Tr. p. 8, L. 8 – 10. Thereafter, Officer
Cowell entered the jail and was completing the citation and booking paperwork. Tr. p. 8, L. 10 –
11. Officer Cowell served the citation upon Sweet at the jail and explained the citation to Sweet.
Tr. p. 8, L. 12 – 15. Officer Cowell explained to Sweet “what the charge was, why it was.” Tr.
p. 8, L. 17. Sweet asked Officer Cowell some questions and they had a conversation regarding
why Officer Cowell had not arrested Ms. Foreman, and Sweet made some statements thereafter,
which were outlined in Officer Cowell’s report. Tr. p. 8, L. 17 – 20. When the State asked
Officer Cowell if Sweet made those statements after Sweet was served the citation, Officer
Cowell responded “I don’t know if it was after or it [sic] was during the booking process. I can’t
exactly recall when.” Tr. p. 8, L. 21 – 24.
Officer Cowell denied asking Sweet any questions. Tr. p. 8, L. 25 – p. 9, L. 1 – 2. In
explaining why he did not ask Sweet any questions, Officer Cowell made reference to a lawsuit
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that Sweet had filed against Officer Cowell, and at that point Officer Cowell did not want to have
any sort of conflict by interrogating or interviewing Sweet. Tr. p. 9, L. 4 – 7.
On cross-examination, Officer Cowell admitted that he carries a body cam on his person,
that it is not hard to operate, and that it is convenient and easy to use. Tr. p. 9, 13 – 18; Tr. p. 9,
L. 25 – p. 10, L. 1. Officer Cowell admitted that he uses his body cam most of the time. Tr. p.
10, L. 2 – 3. However, he generally doesn’t turn the camera on if it’s not something criminal or
if it’s not something that is going to go to court. Tr. p. 10, L. 8 – 9.
Officer Cowell testified that he never read Sweet his Miranda rights. Tr. p. 12, L. 2. On
redirect examination, Officer Cowell stated that he didn’t read Sweet his Miranda rights, because
he was not going to ask Sweet any questions regarding the incident. Tr. p. 12, L. 7 – 11.
Sweet testified on his own behalf at the suppression hearing. Sweet testified that after he
was taken to the jail, he was fingerprinted and had handcuffs on. Tr. p. 14, L. 5 – 12. After he
got into jail attire, Sweet was talking with a jailer, who told Sweet that “Willie wanted to come in
and talk to me.” Tr. p. 14, L. 14 – 15. When Officer Cowell came in, Sweet was standing at the
counter. Tr. p. 14, L. 20 – 21. Sweet sat down “at the little place where – where you sit while
they’re talking to you.” Tr. p. 14, L. 23 – 24. Officer Cowell sat down as well. Tr. p. 14, L. 25
– p. 15, L. 1. Officer Cowell talked first, telling Sweet that he was giving Sweet a citation for
domestic battery in the presence of minor children. Tr. p. 15, L. 2 – 4. Officer Cowell asked
Sweet “what happened?” Tr. p. 15, L. 6. Officer Cowell gave Sweet the citation first. Tr. p. 15,
L. 9. Sweet restated the question that Officer Cowell posed to him as “what happened up there?”
Tr. p. 15, L. 11. Officer Cowell did not ask Sweet any other questions. Tr. p. 15, L. 12 – 13.
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On cross-examination by the State, Sweet testified as follows about his response to
Officer Cowell’s “supposed” question:
I said – I said, uh, Ms. Foreman pushed my mother down and I ran across the
track and told her to get away from my seventy-eight year old mother and I . . .
removed her from where my mother was. I turned around and helped my mother
get up and then my mother and I walked back across the track and we went to the
stands and got our stuff and I went out to the – I went out by the gate and waited
for the police to show up ‘cause I knew they were coming.
Tr. p. 15, L. 17 – 24.
After hearing the evidence and the arguments of counsel on the motion to suppress, the
magistrate first observed, “[w]ell in my course of having to determine probable cause, of course,
I read the police reports and it seems to me that, [trial counsel], that Mr. Sweet basically made
that exact same statement at a multiple – number of times to a number of people at the scene.”
Tr. p. 19, L. 2 – 5.
In his assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the magistrate stated the following:
in all these years, I’ve never been asked to decide who is telling the truth in terms
of whether or not some question was asked between the officer and the defendant.
It’s – this is rather unusual, but it does seem to me that Officer Cowell made a
conscious decision ahead of time. He wasn’t going to interrogate Mr. Sweet
because he didn’t want to get into this whole concept of whether he’s, you know,
doing this because he’s biased against Mr. Sweet or whatever and I think it’s
unlikely that Mr. Sweet was interrogated. I think what is far more likely is he was
handed the ticket, he was told what he’s being charged with and he spontaneously
gave his side of the story, which is somewhat consistent with, according to the
police reports, what he told numerous people at the scene. So I think that is the
most likely explanation as to what occurred.
Tr. p. 20, L. 10 – 20.
The magistrate continued,
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I would also note that the sequence of events is not what I would con – what I
would expect if interrogation were to occur. Interrogation usually occurs so that
the police can get some facts to then charge someone and the undisputed portion
of this is that both – both the officer and Mr. Sweet agree that the charge was
written out and he was charged and handed the charging documents and the
allegation is then he asked an interrogation question of what happened. Well, it’s
not impossible, but again it’s unlikely that an officer does that, because they try to
find out what happened before they hand somebody the charging document.
Tr. p. 20, L. 20 – 25; p. 21, L. 1 – 2.
The magistrate found there was no interrogation while Sweet was in custody, and denied
the Motion to Suppress.
After oral argument on Sweet’s appeal to the District Court, the District Court entered its
Opinion and Order on Appeal. In reference to the Motion to Suppress, the District Court found
that, sitting in its appellate capacity, it was constrained to accept the magistrate’s findings of fact
unless they were clearly erroneous. R., p. 257. The District Court ruled that the magistrate’s
finding that Officer Cowell’s assertions that he did not question Sweet to be a more credible
depiction of the conversation at the jail was not clearly erroneous. Id. “Accordingly, the Court
is constrained to only review whether Cowell’s reading the citation and explaining the charge to
Sweet amounted to an interrogation.” R., pp. 257 – 258. The District Court found that Officer
Cowell’s reading the citation and explaining the charges to Sweet was not reasonably likely to
elicit incriminating responses. R., p. 258. “While Cowell did inform Sweet that he was under
arrest for Domestic Battery in the Presence of a Minor Child prior to transporting him to jail, the
Court is not persuaded that the subsequent formal presentation of the citation is, as a result, not
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an act normally attendant to arrest and custody.” R., p. 259. The District Court affirmed the
magistrate’s denial of the Motion to Suppress. Id.
On the Motions to take judicial notice, the District Court found that “[t]he magistrate
gave a reasoned explanation in denying the motion to take judicial notice, differentiating the
ultimate judgment issued in the opinions from findings that Foreman had been untruthful.” R., p.
259. The District Court further found that
[t]he opinions of the magistrate regarding Foreman’s truthfulness are just that –
opinions – not facts in and of themselves. These opinions were expressed in
deciding unrelated custody matters and a determination regarding Foreman’s
truthfulness or, lack thereof, in court was not the ultimate issue decided in the
case. Further, an instruction informing the jury that Foreman was believed to be
dishonest in other cases would be inappropriate as it would be an impermissible
comment from the court on a witness’s truthfulness, a matter which would be for
the jury to decide.
R., p. 260.
The District Court affirmed the magistrate’s decision denying the Motions to take judicial
notice. Id.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Did the magistrate err in denying Sweet’s Motion to Suppress?

2.

Did the magistrate err in denying Sweet’s Motions to take judicial notice?
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ARGUMENT
I.

Standards of Review.

When reviewing a decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity, the
Supreme Court will review the record and the magistrate court's decision independently of, but
with due regard for, the district court's decision. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672
(2008).
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. State v. Page, 140 Idaho
841, 843 (2004). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court
accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. Id. The appellate court
will not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v.
Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 417 (2015).
The Idaho appellate courts review lower court decisions admitting or excluding evidence
under the abuse of discretion standard. Newman v. State, 149 Idaho 225, 226 (Ct. App. 2010).
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the Court inquires: (1) whether the lower
court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific
choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by exercise of reason. State v. Perry, 139
Idaho 520, 522 (2003).
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II.

Motion to Suppress.
A.

Miranda v. Arizona.

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme Court established
that the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 444. More specifically, at
the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in
clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. Id. at 467 – 468. The warning
of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and
will be used against the individual in court. Id. at 469. The need for counsel to protect the Fifth
Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning,
but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires. Id. at 470. “No
effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless
specifically made after the warnings we here delineate have been given.” Id.
B.

Rhode Island v. Innis.

In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the United States Supreme Court
determined the meaning of the term “interrogation” for purposes of Miranda:
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The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is
subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say,
the term ″interrogation″ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning,
but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.
446 U.S. at 300 – 301.
The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect,
rather than the intent of the police. Id. at 301. An “incriminating response” is any responsewhether inculpatory or exculpatory-that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial. Id. at
301, Footnote 5. (Emphasis in original.)
C.

Credibility of Witnesses.

“A trial court most certainly may consider the absence of a recording, when the
interrogating officer conveniently could have made one, in evaluating the officer's credibility.
Thus, the failure to record an interrogation may be a factor in assessing the accuracy and
truthfulness of the officer's account of the event.” State v. Dominguez, 137 Idaho 681, 684 (Ct.
App. 2002), quoting In the Interest of Doe, 130 Idaho 811, 815 (Ct.App.1997).
D.

Application to Current Case.

It is undisputed that Sweet was in custody for Miranda purposes, and that Officer
Cowell had not advised Sweet of his rights pursuant to Miranda. If Officer Cowell had indeed
asked Sweet, “what happened,” or “what happened up there,” then Officer Cowell subjected
Sweet to express questioning that required Miranda warnings in order for Sweet’s response to be
admissible in evidence at trial.
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However, even if Officer Cowell did not subject Sweet to express questioning, Officer
Cowell engaged in the functional equivalent of express questioning. During his conversation
with Sweet at the jail, Officer Cowell did not confine his statements to merely reading the
citation to Sweet. Officer Cowell testified at the suppression hearing that he not only explained
to Sweet what the charge was, but also “why it was.” According to Officer Cowell, he and Sweet
also “had some conversation regarding why [Officer Cowell] had not arrested Ms. Foreman, and
[Sweet] had some statements thereafter.” Officer Cowell did not elaborate on what he told
Sweet to explain why Sweet was being charged and why Ms. Foreman was not. However,
Sweet’s incriminating statements were made after and in response to Officer Cowell’s
explanation of why Sweet was being charged and why Ms. Foreman was not. Officer Cowell
should have known that his explanation was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from Sweet, and therefore even if Officer Cowell did not subject Sweet to express questioning,
he subjected Sweet to its functional equivalent.

Furthermore, Officer Cowell couldn’t

remember if the statements were made after or during the booking process. If the statements
were made after the booking process was complete, then the statements were not normally
attendant to arrest and custody.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Cowell admitted that he carries a body camera on his
person, that it is not hard to operate, and that it is convenient and easy to use. Officer Cowell
admitted that he uses his body camera most of the time. However, he generally doesn’t turn the
camera on if it’s not something criminal or if it’s not something that is going to go to court. The
current case was criminal and something that was “going to court,” the very type of situation in
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which Officer Cowell normally uses his body camera. Nevertheless, Officer Cowell failed to use
his body camera during his interaction with Sweet. Officer Cowell wasn’t asked why he didn’t
use his body camera in this instance, and he didn’t volunteer an explanation. If anything, one
would think that in this instance Officer Cowell had even more reason to record his interaction
with Sweet, in order to protect himself from any possible claims that Sweet may raise against
him, in light of the lawsuit that Officer Cowell referred to at the suppression hearing.
The magistrate failed to take into consideration Officer Cowell’s choice to not record his
interaction with Sweet in comparing the credibility of Officer Cowell’s testimony to Sweet’s
testimony at the suppression hearing. However, even given the finding that Officer Cowell’s
testimony was more credible, the magistrate failed to consider Officer Cowell’s own testimony.
Officer Cowell testified that he had not only explained to Sweet what the charge was, but also
“why it was,” and that Officer Cowell and Sweet also “had some conversation regarding why
[Officer Cowell] had not arrested Ms. Foreman.” Officer Cowell acknowledged that Sweet
made his incriminating statements after Cowell informed Sweet of those things.
Nevertheless, the magistrate court focused on its own personal belief that any questioning
would have occurred before the citation was served on Sweet, not after. This finding of fact by
the magistrate is clearly erroneous, because it is not based upon any evidence in the record, and it
conflicts with the testimony of the State’s own witness as to the sequence of events. Moreover,
the magistrate’s finding of fact that it was more likely that Sweet spontaneously gave his side of
the story upon being served with the citation is clearly erroneous, in light of Officer Cowell’s
own testimony. The District Court erred in determining that the magistrate’s findings of fact
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were not clearly erroneous. The District Court further erred in finding that Officer Cowell’s
reading the citation and explaining the charges to Sweet was not reasonably likely to elicit
incriminating responses, in light of Officer Cowell’s own testimony regarding the content of his
conversation with Sweet.
III.

Motions to take Judicial Notice.
A.

I.R.E. 201.

Idaho Rule of Evidence (hereinafter “I.R.E.”) 201 provides in part as follows:
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative
facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether
requested or not. When a court takes judicial notice of records, exhibits, or
transcripts from the court file in the same or a separate case, the court shall
identify the specific documents or items that were so noticed.
(d) When mandatory. When a party makes an oral or written request that
a court take judicial notice of records, exhibits or transcripts from the court file
in the same or a separate case, the party shall identify the specific documents or
items for which the judicial notice is requested or shall proffer to the court and
serve on all parties copies of such documents or items. A court shall take judicial
notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.
(Emphasis added.)
B.

Adjudicative Facts.

An "adjudicative fact" is "[a] controlling or operative fact, rather than a background fact;
a fact that concerns the parties to a judicial or administrative proceeding and that helps the court
or agency determine how the law applies to those parties. For example, adjudicative facts
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include those that the jury weighs." Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508, 512 (2011),
quoting Black's Law Dictionary 669 (9th ed. 2009).
In Fortin v. State, 160 Idaho 437 (Ct. App. 2016), the petitioner in a post-conviction
proceeding sought to have the district court take judicial notice of "the entire underlying district
court and appellate records" in his aggravated battery case and subsequent appellate case, as well
as the companion aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer case. 160 Idaho at 441. The
district court denied Fortin's "blanket request" for judicial notice. Id. The Idaho Court of
Appeals held that because Fortin failed to comply with the requirements of I.R.E. 201(d), there
was no mandatory duty imposed on the district court to take blanket judicial notice of the
requested case files. 160 Idaho at 443.
In Newman v. State, supra, the petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding sought to have
the district court take judicial notice of a number of documents, including documents relating to
an Idaho State Bar Association professional misconduct proceeding involving Newman's trial
counsel. 149 Idaho at 226. The district court took judicial notice of Newman's original and
amended applications for post-conviction relief; the instant post-conviction relief file; and orders,
transcripts, and other documents from Newman's underlying criminal file. However, the district
court declined to take judicial notice of the documents relating to the state bar misconduct
proceedings. Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, finding that because
documents related to an Idaho State Bar Association professional misconduct proceeding were
not accessible to the district court, they were not capable of accurate and ready determination
under I.R.E. 201(b).
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In Idaho Department of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 160 Idaho 154 (2016), the Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate’s decision to take judicial notice of a transcript of a Child
Protective Act Adjudicatory Hearing. 160 Idaho at 163. Since the prosecutor properly made an
oral request that the magistrate court take judicial notice of a transcript from the court file and
identified the items sought, Idaho Rule of Evidence 201(d) compelled the magistrate to take
notice. Id.
C.

Application to Current Case.

Sweet sought to challenge Foreman’s credibility through his Motions for the magistrate
to take judicial notice of opinions and orders that two magistrates had entered in a child custody
case that involved both Sweet and Foreman. Credibility of a witness is a fact that the jury
weighs. As in Idaho Department of Health & Welfare v. Doe, the documents were of a type
specifically set forth in I.R.E. 201(d), as they were records from the court file in a separate case.
If the transcript of a contested hearing in Idaho Department of Health & Welfare v. Doe satisfies
the requirements of I.R.E. 201(b), then court orders from another court case should also satisfy
the requirements of I.R.E. 201(b).
Moreover, unlike Newman v. State, the documents Sweet sought to be judicially noticed
were accessible to the magistrate. In contrast to Fortin v. State, Sweet did not make a “blanket
request” for judicial notice. Rather, Sweet identified the specific documents for which judicial
notice was requested. Prior to the trial date, Sweet proffered to the magistrate and served on the
State copies of the documents for which judicial notice was requested. Since Sweet requested
judicial notice and supplied the necessary information, judicial notice was mandatory pursuant to
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I.R.E. 201(d). The magistrate’s refusal to judicially notice the documents was an abuse of
discretion. The District Court erred by affirming the magistrate’s decision.
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CONCLUSION
In finding that Sweet was not subjected to express questioning or its functional equivalent
while in custody without the benefit of Miranda warnings, the magistrate made findings of fact
that were clearly erroneous and in disregard of the testimony of even the State’s witness. Sweet
asks this Court to reverse the magistrate’s decision to deny Sweet’s Motion to Suppress, which
was affirmed by the District Court.
It was an abuse of discretion for the magistrate to deny Sweet’s Motions to take judicial
notice when Sweet’s requests met the requirements for mandatory judicial notice pursuant to
I.R.E. 201(d). Sweet asks this Court to reverse the magistrate’s decision to deny Sweet’s
Motions to take judicial notice, which was affirmed by the District Court.
DATED this 6th day of March, 2018.

____________________________________
J. LYNN BROOKS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 34.1, a true and correct electronic
6th
copy of the foregoing was served on the _______
day of March, 2018, at the following email
address:
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, via ecf@ag.idaho.gov

________________________________________
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